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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
persons are conclusively presumed to know the law; it has, however,
met with limited approval"' on the ground that the analogy to the
Neirbo case should be rejected.
As the federal venue statute was designed for the convenience
of defendants, it would seem that the involuntary waiver rule of the
instant case deprives the non-resident not of any substantial right,
but only of an advantage over residents. The majority view as
enunciated by the instant case, while admittedly fictitious, is not
only more consonant with justice but embraces elements which mili-
tate against the minority view, namely, (a) convenience of attend-
ing witnesses, (b) elimination of frequently unsatisfactory depositions,




LIGHT AND AIR. Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining lots
which had been acquired through a common grantor. Defendant
erected a concrete wall ten feet high and three inches from the party
line and plaintiff's kitchen windows, thus preventing the free passage
of light and air. Plaintiff brought suit in equity to compel the de-
fendant to remove the wall. The lower court decreed that the height
of the wall be reduced to six feet, having found that the common
grantor's subsequent separate conveyance created an easement of
light and air by implication because of necessity. Defendant appealed.
It was held that plaintiff had not established that defendant's land
had become the servient tenement; that there was no absolute
necessity upon which the court could base an implied easement, since
a small amount of light and air was admitted through the kitchen
windows, thus constituting only a partial obstruction; and that con-
struction of a skylight in the kitchen ceiling would supply ample
amounts of light and air. Maiorella v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d
374 (1950).
An easement to light and air cannot, in Pennsylvania, be ac-
quired by prescription.' Neither is the English doctrine of ancient
lights a part of the law of that state,' that doctrine being in almost
complete disrepute in the United States.3 Easements to light and air
acquired by express grant are, however, recognized. 4 In that state
equity has also refused to order the removal of a wall shutting out
light and air, even where it was maliciously constructed, and of that
type commonly referred to as "spite fence", the court instead has
held that where a defendant is lawfully entitled to erect the wall
upon his land, the court will not inquire into the motive for so do-
ing.' It would therefore seem obvious that the plaintiff in the instant
case had no alternative except to attempt to establish an easement
by implication because of necessity. This court held he had failed
Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F.Supp. 651 (E.D.Tenn. 1950).
1 Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
2 Beckershoff v. Bomba, 112 Pa. 294, 170 AtI. 449 (Super. Ct. 1934). "An,
cient lights" is the doctrine that long-continued enjoyment of lights and
windows creates a prescriptive right to continued unobstructed use therof.
3 Words and Phrases 388 (Perm. ed. 1940).
3 Humble, Limitations On The Use of Property By Its Owners, 5 Va. L.
Rev. 297, 306 (1918).
4 Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147, 153 (1880).
RECENT CASES
to do so and further stated that even if an absolute necessity would
imply an easement, the obstruction was only partial and the plaintiff
had a remedy by expending a reasonable sum to construct a skylight.
Court decisions involving implied easements to light and air can be
broadly categorized into three groups: (1) the first group of courts
indicate that they will imply an easement of light and air where
really or absolutely necessary;' (2) the second group of decisions
would imply easements of light and air in the same manner as they
imply an easement of a way of necessity;- (3) the last group of de
cisions hold that no easement of light and air can be acquired except
by express grant or covenant.' Clearly Pennsylvania comes within
the first group of cases and has established the test of "absolute
necessity."
However, where a structure has been erected which serves no
useful purpose or where its usefulness is incidental and the dominant
reason for its erection is to annoy adjoining landowners, courts are
in sharp conflict as to their abatement as a nuisance, even though
recognizing them as "spite fences." It is now generally recognized
that equity will act to restrain the erection of "spite fences"' and the
leading case" establishing this "modern' rule"" presumed equity to
have the inherent authority to authorize their abatement'as nuisances
or enjoin their construction even in the absence of statute. The court
there reasoned that no man had the legal right to make a malicious
and unbeneficial use of his property to damage his neighbor. Many
states have adopted this view,' while others have given an injured
landowner statutory relief' by declaring such acts to be a tort.
It is submitted that those jurisdictions which have not adopted
the rule of Burke v. Smith would lessen the injustice to an injured
plaintiff by implying an easement of light, and air whenever reason-
ably necessary. Application of such a test would not absolutely
bind courts but would allow them to exercise a discretionary latitude
as the individual facts warranted. The courts' concept of a reason-
able necessity will permit them to vary the interpretation as the
growth of the community and urban areas warrants.
Lavern C. Neff
Cohen v. Perrino. 355 Pa. 455, 50 A.2d 348 (1947).
Rennyson's Appeal, sUpra note 4; Powell v. Sims, 5 W.Va. 1 (1871).
Fowler v. Wick, 74 N.J. Eq. 603, 70 At. 682 (1908).
Baird v. Hanna, 328 111. 436, 159 N.E. 793 (1927); accord, Morrison v.
Marquardt, 24 Iowa 35 (1867).
Daniel v. Birmingham Dental Mfg. Co., 207 Ala. 659, 93 So. 652 (1922).
1' Burke v. Smith, 69 Mich. 380, 37 N.W. 838 (1888). For a later case
where it was held that moving a structure maliciously within a few feet of
an adjoining owner's property was not actionable because the structure
served a useful purpose, see Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 107 Mich. 444, 65
N.W. 275 (1895).
I Cooley, Torts §56 (4th ed. 1932).
See, e.g., Hornsby v. Smith, 191 Ga. 491, 13 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1941)
(wherein the court said ". . . malicious use of property resulting in injury
to another is never a 'lawful use' but is in every case unlawful."); Dun,
bar v. O'Brien, 117 Neb. 245, 220 N.W. 278 (1928); Racich v. Mas-
trovish, 65 S.D. 321, 273 N.W. 660 (1937) (spite fence photograph-
ically illustrated).
13 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §5907 (1930); Mass. Ann. Laws c. 49, §21
(1932); For discussion of cases wherein courts have interpreted "spite
fence" statutes, see Note, 133 A.L.R. 691, 704 (1941).
